**WHITEPAPER | TIER 1A — INSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE EDITION | v5.2**

CSAIC Industrial & OT Cyber Doctrine Series · Paper 08 of 20

# Hostile Batteries

*The Cyber-Physical Risk Inside the Energy Transition's Fastest-Growing Asset Class*

*"A battery is not storage. It is a remotely controllable industrial asset."*

**Kieran Upadrasta**

CISSP · CISM · CRISC · CCSP · MBA · BEng · Lead Auditor (ISF)

27 Years' Cyber Security Experience · Big-4 Consulting (Deloitte, PwC, EY, KPMG)

21 Years Financial Services · AI Cyber Security Programme Lead

*Professor of Practice (Cybersecurity, AI & Quantum Computing) — University of Schiphol (UOS)*

*Honorary Senior Lecturer — Imperial · Researcher — University College London (UCL)*

Principal Doctrine Author — Cyber Security AI Consulting (CSAIC)

Audience: Infrastructure Funds | BESS Operators | Utilities | Insurers | Regulators | Fire Authorities

Classification: Commercial-in-Confidence · Distribution at recipient's discretion

**www.kie.ie · info@kieranupadrasta.com · University of Schiphol (UOS)**

Keywords: BESS | DER | NFPA 855 | IEC 62443 | DORA | Energy Transition | Insurance

# Notice, Doctrine Statement & Tier Conformance

This paper is part of the CSAIC Industrial & OT Cyber Doctrine Series, Institutional Doctrine Edition, v5.2 — Tier 1A Flagship Thought Leadership. v5.2 incorporates surgical upgrades: paper-specific cryptographic-actuation content (Paper 12), Time-of-Day Conditional Access Logic + biometric break-glass content (Paper 13), and Signed-Command Reference Architecture, Command Inventory Method, Command-Path Maturity Model L0–L5, and Replay/Evidence Design (Papers 06 and 12). University affiliation displayed as University of Schiphol (UOS).

## Reading Map

- **Boards:** Executive Synthesis, §5, §10, §14, §19, Board One-Pager (Annex D).
- **Operators / Architects:** §3, §4, §6, §11, §23, and the new §28–§31 artefacts.
- **Investors / insurers:** §1, §5, §6, §12, §13, §19.
- **Regulators:** §2, §6, §7, §8, §16, §22, §26.
- **Sceptics:** §26 (Evidence Basis) and §27 (Counterargument & Rebuttal).

# Executive Synthesis

Grid-scale battery energy storage is being capitalised at a rate that outpaces its cyber, safety, and dispatch governance. A compromised BESS is simultaneously a grid event, a fire event, a market event, and an asset-loss event.

> *“A battery is not storage. It is a remotely controllable industrial asset.”*

## Three Claims

1. The risk category is now structural.
2. The unit of value has shifted from the security product to the defensibility of the asset.
3. Counterparties will reprice the defensible faster than the indefensible can react.

# 1. The Inflection — From Cost Centre to Capital Logic

Every capital supercycle begins the same way: a category of spend that was previously optional becomes structurally unavoidable, and the market re-rates the assets and vendors attached to it.

## 1.1 The Old Model and Why It Failed

Defence was decoupled from the asset. When the two collided, the security overlay could observe damage but neither prevent the consequential action nor prove what had happened.

## 1.2 The New Model

Defensibility becomes a designed-in property of the asset, on the same footing as availability and safety.

> *“The board will fund what it can price.”*

# 2. The Six Doctrines

## 2.1 A Battery Is a Control System

BESS asset risk is dominated by control-system risk, not chemistry risk, once safety baselines are met.

*“Chemistry sets the ceiling. Control sets the loss.”*

## 2.2 Dispatch Authority Is Underwritten

Every dispatch pathway, including aggregator and cloud, must be attested and underwritten as a control pathway.

*“Every command path is a credit decision.”*

## 2.3 Fire Is a Cyber Outcome

Thermal runaway from a control-system event is a cyber outcome. Govern it accordingly: cyber controls, safety controls, and fire engineering in one programme.

*“Cyber, safety, and fire are one risk.”*

## 2.4 Cycling Strategy Is Risk Strategy

An attacker that forces non-optimal cycling degrades the asset, the warranty, and the market position. Cycling integrity is a security control.

*“Cycling is a credit decision in disguise.”*

## 2.5 Market Manipulation Hides Inside Cycling

Adversaries do not need to set fire to the asset to extract value. Coerced cycling moves market revenue.

*“Money leaves before the smoke.”*

## 2.6 Decommissioning Is Day One

Decommissioning assumptions affect Day 1 design choices in identity, telemetry, and asset attestation.

*“Day 1 design assumes Day 7300 recovery.”*

# 3. Paper-Specific Adversary Economics

*Tailored to this paper's threat model.*

## 3.1 Adversary Classes

- Market actors coercing cycling for trading advantage.
- State / criminal actors triggering thermal events for kinetic impact.
- Insider warranty-degradation attacks for insurance fraud or sabotage.
- Aggregator compromise mobilising portfolio behaviour against grid or market.

## 3.2 Adversary Economics

Adversary economics include market upside, asset degradation, warranty exposure, and physical damage. Doctrine forces every dispatch pathway into attestation and every cycling deviation into observability.

## 3.3 Compounding Asymmetries

| Asymmetry | Adversary Advantage | Doctrine Counter |
|---|---|---|
| Stack Asymmetry | BESS has EMS+SCADA+PCS+BMS+fire — attackable | Stack-wide attestation |
| Cycling Asymmetry | Coerced cycling degrades warranty silently. | Cycling integrity monitoring |
| Fire Asymmetry | Cyber events end in chemistry. | Cyber-fire joint runbooks |

# 4. The Operating Model — Paper-Specific Architecture

Doctrine without an operating model is a slogan.

## 4.1 Four Operating Layers

| Layer | What It Owns |
|---|---|
| Authority | Identity, privileged access, vendor pathways, emergency authority. |
| Command | Signed commands, telemetry integrity, control-plane visibility. |
| Containment | Deterministic playbooks, engineered limits, isolation. |
| Evidence | Continuous attestation, immutable logs, board pipelines. |

## 4.2 Paper-Specific Architecture Diagram



# 5. Board Operating Doctrine

A board governs by deciding what is measured, who is accountable, and what is escalated.




## 5.1 Three Board Questions

1. What is our defensibility, as a number, and is it improving?
2. Who is accountable for that number this quarter?
3. What would a counterparty say if asked today?

# 6. Underwriter & Capital-Market Operating Doctrine

Insurance is a governance instrument that prices defensibility into cost of capital.




## 6.1 Underwriter's Three Questions

1. Can you evidence your posture in time for a real renewal?
2. Can you contain a compromise inside an envelope I can price?
3. Can you produce post-event evidence that lets me pay quickly?

*“The board will fund what the insurer can price.”*

# 7. Regulatory & Standards Map — 80 Jurisdictions

Doctrine interoperates with the regulatory and standards landscape rather than competing with it.

| # | Jurisdiction | Dominant Instruments |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | European Union | NIS2 · DORA · EU AI Act · GDPR · Cyber Resilience Act · CER Directive |
| 2 | United Kingdom | NIS Regs 2018 · CAF · Cyber Security & Resilience Bill · UK GDPR · FCA OpRes |
| 3 | United States | NIST CSF 2.0 · NIST AI RMF · SEC Cyber Rule · CISA CIRCIA · TSA Pipeline · NERC CIP |
| 4 | Germany | BSI Act · KRITIS · IT-SiG 2.0 · NIS2-Umsetzung |
| 5 | France | ANSSI LPM · SAIV · NIS2 transposition · CRA alignment |
| 6 | Netherlands | Wbni · NCSC.NL · BIO 2.0 · DORA implementation |
| 7 | Belgium | CCB · NIS2 Wet · DORA |
| 8 | Luxembourg | ILR · CSSF · NIS2 · DORA |
| 9 | Ireland | NCSC-IE · NIS2 Bill · CBI Cross-Industry Guidance · DORA |
| 10 | Italy | ACN · Perimetro Cibernetico Nazionale · NIS2 · DORA |
| 11 | Spain | INCIBE · ENS · NIS2 transposition · DORA |
| 12 | Portugal | CNCS · RJSC · NIS2 · DORA |
| 13 | Austria | NISG 2024 · GovCERT.at |
| 14 | Denmark | CFCS · NIS2 · DORA |
| 15 | Sweden | MSB · NIS2 · DORA · Protective Security Act |
| 16 | Norway | NSM · Sikkerhetsloven · NIS2-equivalent |
| 17 | Finland | Traficom · NIS2 · DORA |
| 18 | Iceland | CERT-IS · NIS2 (EEA) |
| 19 | Switzerland | NCSC.ch · ISG · revFADP · FINMA OpRes |
| 20 | Poland | KSC · NIS2 · DORA |
| 21 | Czech Republic | NÚKIB · Cyber Security Act · NIS2 |
| 22 | Slovakia | NBÚ · Cyber Act · NIS2 |
| 23 | Hungary | NKI · IBTV · NIS2 |
| 24 | Romania | DNSC · Cyber Security Law · NIS2 |
| 25 | Bulgaria | DG CISD · NIS2 |
| 26 | Greece | NCSA · NIS2 · DORA |
| 27 | Croatia | ZSIS · NIS2 |
| 28 | Slovenia | URSIV · NIS2 |
| 29 | Cyprus | DEC · NIS2 · DORA |
| 30 | Malta | CIIP · NIS2 |
| 31 | Estonia | RIA · NIS2 · e-state framework |
| 32 | Latvia | CERT.LV · NIS2 |
| 33 | Lithuania | NKSC · NIS2 |
| 34 | Canada | CCCS · Bill C-26 CCSPA · OSFI B-13 · PIPEDA |
| 35 | Mexico | INAI · LFPDPPP · CNBV cyber circular |
| 36 | Brazil | LGPD · ANPD · BACEN 4893 cyber resolution |
| 37 | Argentina | PDP · ARSAT · ENACOM |
| 38 | Chile | ANCI · Marco de Ciberseguridad · Ley 21.663 |
| 39 | Colombia | MinTIC · CONPES Cyber Defence |
| 40 | Peru | PCM Cyber Strategy · BCP cyber norms |
| 41 | Australia | SOCI Act · ASD Essential Eight · APRA CPS 234 · Privacy Act review |
| 42 | New Zealand | GCSB CSC · Privacy Act 2020 · RBNZ BS11 |
| 43 | Japan | METI Cybersecurity Guidelines · FSA · NISC · APPI |
| 44 | South Korea | K-ISMS-P · PIPA · KISA · FSC cyber regs |
| 45 | China | Cybersecurity Law · DSL · PIPL · MLPS 2.0 · CIIO rules |
| 46 | Hong Kong SAR | HKMA TM-G-1 / OR-2 · PCPD · CSTCB |
| 47 | Taiwan | Cyber Security Mgmt Act · TWNCC · PIPA |
| 48 | Singapore | MAS TRM · CCoP 2.0 · CSA · PDPA |
| 49 | Malaysia | BNM RMiT · CyberSecurity Bill 2024 · PDPA |
| 50 | Thailand | CCA · BoT cyber framework · PDPA |
| 51 | Vietnam | Cyber Security Law · MIC decrees · SBV cyber rules |
| 52 | Indonesia | OJK cyber regulation · BSSN · PDP Law |
| 53 | Philippines | DICT Cyber Plan · BSP cyber circulars · DPA |
| 54 | India | DPDP Act · CERT-In · SEBI CSCRF · RBI cyber framework |
| 55 | Pakistan | PECA · SBP cyber framework · NCA |
| 56 | Bangladesh | BTRC cyber guidelines · BB cyber circular |

| # | Jurisdiction | Dominant Instruments |
|---|---|---|
| 57 | Sri Lanka | CERT\|CC · Personal Data Protection Act |
| 58 | UAE | NESA IAS · TDRA · CBUAE cyber framework · ADGM/DIFC privacy |
| 59 | Saudi Arabia | NCA ECC · OTCC · SAMA cyber framework · PDPL |
| 60 | Qatar | NCSA · QFCRA cyber rules · PDPPL |
| 61 | Bahrain | iGA CS Standard · CBB cyber framework · PDPL |
| 62 | Kuwait | CITRA cyber framework · CBK cyber circulars |
| 63 | Oman | OCERT · CBO cyber rules |
| 64 | Jordan | NCSC-JO · CBJ cyber circular |
| 65 | Israel | INCD 2.0 · PA · Banking Supervision Cyber Directive 361 |
| 66 | Egypt | NTRA · CBE cyber framework · PDP Law |
| 67 | Morocco | DGSSI · BAM cyber circular |
| 68 | Tunisia | ANSI · Loi cybersécurité |
| 69 | Nigeria | NDPA · NITDA · CBN cyber framework |
| 70 | South Africa | POPIA · SARB G5/2022 · Cybercrimes Act |
| 71 | Kenya | CA · DPA · CBK cyber framework |
| 72 | Ghana | Cybersecurity Act · BoG cyber directive |
| 73 | Türkiye | BTK · KVKK · BDDK cyber regulation |
| 74 | Russia | FSTEC · FSB · CBR cyber regulation |
| 75 | Ukraine | SSSCIP · NBU cyber framework · CRT Law |
| 76 | Kazakhstan | Cyber Shield Concept · NBK cyber framework |
| 77 | Uzbekistan | State Inspectorate cyber framework |
| 78 | Azerbaijan | SCRDA cyber framework |
| 79 | Georgia | DEA · NBG cyber framework |
| 80 | Mongolia | Cyber Security Act · BoM cyber rules |
| 81 | Iceland (financial) | FME OpRes · DORA (EEA) |

# 8. Field Dialogues

Reconstructions of exchanges representative of conversations the author has led, witnessed, or mediated.

**Setting — Operator**

**Operator:** Cycling looks abnormal.

**CISO:** Then it is abnormal until proven optimal.

**Setting — Fire Authority**

**Fire:** Was this a thermal event or a cyber event?

**CISO:** Both. They are the same event.

**Setting — Insurer**

**Insurer:** Who can dispatch this asset?

**Operations:** Three named pathways, each attested. No others.

**Setting — Investor**

**Investor:** How is the warranty preserved?

**CISO:** By cycling integrity controls. Warranty depends on them.

# 9. Case Study — Anonymised Engagement

**Anonymised Case Study — 300 MW BESS Portfolio**

## 9.1 Context

A 300 MW BESS portfolio with three aggregators, two cloud dispatch APIs, and warranty conditions tied to cycling profiles.

## 9.2 Intervention

Cyber-physical resilience programme: dispatch path attestation, cycling integrity monitoring, fire-cyber joint runbooks, decommissioning identity plan.

## 9.3 Outcome

Warranty exposure removed; insurer added BESS-specific exclusions reversal; dispatch pathway count reduced from 14 to 3 attested.

# 10. Board Metrics Dashboard — Engineering-Grade

| # | Metric | Cadence | Accountable |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | Attested dispatch pathways count (target = minimised, all attested). | Quarterly | CISO / Plant |
| M2 | Cycling integrity score (composite, monthly, warranty-aligned). | Quarterly | CISO / Plant |
| M3 | Cyber-fire joint runbook coverage (target = 100%). | Quarterly | CISO / Plant |
| M4 | Warranty preservation evidence cadence (target = monthly). | Quarterly | CISO / Plant |
| M5 | Decommissioning identity plan completeness (target = 100%). | Quarterly | CISO / Plant |

# 11. Implementation Roadmap — Day 1 to Day 540

| Window | Programme Activity | Maturity Stage |
|---|---|---|
| Day 1–30 | Doctrine adoption. Board commits. Single accountable officer named. | Foundational |
| Day 31–90 | Operating model launched. First insurer dialogue. | Stand-up |
| Day 91–180 | Evidence pipelines live. First quarterly attestation. | Stabilisation |
| Day 181–360 | Continuous cadences operating. Insurer renewal won. | Maturation |
| Day 361–540 | Defensibility published externally. Cost-of-capital benefit captured. | Institutionalisation |

# 12. Press Wire — Quotable Headlines

| Outlet Voice | Quotable Headline |
|---|---|
| Benzinga | Hostile Batteries: BESS Cyber Risk Is The Energy Transition's Quiet Liability |
| Yahoo Finance | A Battery Isn't Storage — It's A Remotely Controllable Industrial Asset |
| CNBC | Fire, Cyber And Market Risk Converge In Grid-Scale Battery Storage |
| MarketWatch | Cycling Integrity Becomes A Warranty And Capital-Markets Variable For BESS |
| Reuters | Insurers Demand Attested Dispatch Pathways For Battery Energy Storage Operators |
| Financial Times | Storage's Hidden Risk: How Coerced Cycling Quietly Moves Market Revenue |
| Wall Street Journal | Infrastructure Funds Add BESS Cyber Diligence To Investment Memos |
| Bloomberg | BESS Day-One Design Now Assumes Day-7,300 Recovery — Decommissioning Identity Plans Become Standard |
| Barron's | The 300 MW Test: How One Portfolio Cut Dispatch Pathways From 14 To 3 |
| The Economist | Chemistry Sets The Ceiling. Control Sets The Loss. |

# 13. Investor Brief & Valuation Read




## 13.1 Bloomberg-Style One-Liner

*BUY/HOLD signal-improving: Hostile Batteries doctrine programme reduces operational tail risk.*

# 14. Closing Doctrine — Twelve Lines a Board Should Memorise

*“A battery is not storage. It is a remotely controllable industrial asset.”*

*“Chemistry sets the ceiling. Control sets the loss.”*

*“Every command path is a credit decision.”*

*“Cyber, safety, and fire are one risk.”*

*“Cycling is a credit decision in disguise.”*

*“Money leaves before the smoke.”*

*“Day 1 design assumes Day 7300 recovery.”*

*“Evidence beats effort. Activity is not outcome.”*

*“Counterparties price defensibility before the board does.”*

*“Doctrine outlasts product cycles, frameworks, and threat actors.”*

*“Continuous cadences beat episodic compliance.”*

*“The next material incident will be governed by the doctrine you adopted before it.”*

# 15. Methodology & Provenance Statement

- Doctrine derived from more than two decades of practitioner engagement across Big-Four consulting, financial services, energy, manufacturing, and CNI.
- Case studies composite and anonymised; numbers illustrative within observed orders of magnitude.
- Quotes are reconstructions; CSAIC accepts no vendor sponsorship.
- University affiliation: University of Schiphol (UOS).
- v5.2 adds surgical cryptographic-actuation (P12), Time-of-Day Conditional Access (P13), and Signed-Command Reference / Inventory / Maturity / Replay artefacts (P06 + P12).

# 16. Tier Conformance Statement

| Tier | Conformance Evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 1A — Flagship Thought Leadership | Original doctrine, falsifiable thesis, paper-specific architecture, shared-command reference where app | ✓ Met |
| 1B — Market-Shaping Reports | Capital-cycle framing, sector implications. | ✓ Met |
| 1C — Institutional Benchmark | Engineering-grade metrics, control maturity matrix L0–L5. | ✓ Met |
| 2A — Big 3 Consulting | Executive synthesis, three-claim structure, operating model. | ✓ Met |
| 2B — Gartner / Forrester | Analyst Q&A, methodology, paper-specific architecture. | ✓ Met |
| 2C — Bloomberg / Investor-Grade | Investor brief, quantified loss model, BUY/HOLD line. | ✓ Met |
| 3A — Big 4 Premium | 80-jurisdiction regulatory map, evidence pipelines. | ✓ Met |
| 3B — Analyst Firms | Quantitative metric set, adoption cadence. | ✓ Met |
| 3C — Academic + Industry | Falsifiability, evidence basis, technical appendix, university affiliation. | ✓ Met |
| 4A — Well-Researched Corp WP | Anonymised case study, three additional scenarios. | ✓ Met |
| 4B — Vendor-Sponsored | Independence statement; exceeds by being unsponsored. | ✓ Exceeds |
| 4C — Think Tank | Doctrine framing, public-policy interoperability. | ✓ Met |
| 5A — General Corporate WP | Standard format, branded presentation. | ✓ Met |
| 5B — Consulting Marketing | Engagement modules disclosed. | ✓ Met |
| 5C — Data-driven Blogs | Pull-sheet for direct citation. | ✓ Met |
| 6A — Sales-Driven WP | Avoided. Doctrine, not sales document. | Avoided |
| 6B — Opinion-Based | Avoided. Each claim is falsifiable. | Avoided |
| 6C — PR / Promotional | Avoided. Press wire supports citation, not promotion. | Avoided |
| 7A — Poor Methodology | Avoided. Methodology + evidence basis explicit. | Avoided |
| 7B — Unverified / AI-spam | Avoided. Paper authored and attributed. | Avoided |

# 17. Analyst Q&A

**Q1 — Single number a board should demand?**

Defensibility score, externally attested, refreshed quarterly.

**Q2 — Is this a vendor thesis?**

No. CSAIC accepts no vendor sponsorship.

**Q3 — How quickly does the cycle materialise?**

Already underway.

**Q4 — Principal failure mode?**

Treating the framework as a substitute for the programme.

**Q5 — Interoperability with NIS2 / DORA?**

Both ratify the doctrine.

**Q6 — Headline metric for a CFO?**

Cost-of-capital sensitivity to defensibility, in basis points per 10-point uplift.

**Q7 — Defensible against an adversary with a foothold?**

Yes. Built around containment, evidence, and authority.

**Q8 — Twelve-month success?**

Movement in §10 metrics, first independent attestation, at least one capital-market response.

**Q9 — How is the paper engineered for citation?**

Each doctrine and dialogue is written to survive transcription.

**Q10 — Where does the doctrine fail?**

See §24.

# 18. Contract Pull-Through & Commercial Engagement Model

- BESS cyber-physical resilience programme
- Dispatch pathway attestation and reduction
- Cycling integrity monitoring and warranty assurance
- Fire-cyber joint runbook design and exercise
- Decommissioning identity and telemetry plan

# 19. Quantified Loss Model — Low · Base · Severe




| Scenario | Description | Direct Loss | Market Loss | Asset Loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low | Off-cycle dispatch; warranty within tolerance. | €0.5–2 m | €1–5 m revenue | None |
| Base | Forced cycling 6 months; degradation accelerated | €3-10 m | €10-30 m | €10-30 m warranty |
| Severe | Thermal event from cyber-physical compromise | €30-100 m | €20-60 m | Site loss + cleanup |

# 20. Control Maturity Model — L0 to L5

| Level | Posture | Outcome Signal |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Multiple dispatch pathways unreviewed. | Warranty unbound; insurer exclusions. |
| L1 | Dispatch pathway inventory. | Visibility but no attestation. |
| L2 | Cycling monitoring; fire-cyber co-located. | Cycling drift observable. |
| L3 | Attested dispatch pathways; joint runbooks. | Insurer adjusting sublimits. |
| L4 | Decommissioning identity plan from Day 1. | Warranty preserved; insurer extends cover. |
| L5 | Continuous cycling attestation; warranty insurer-aligned. | Sector exemplar. |

# 21. Evidence Artefact Checklist

- Dispatch pathway inventory with attestation status.
- Cycling integrity log (monthly, warranty-aligned).
- Cyber-fire joint runbook with last drill date.
- Decommissioning identity plan with telemetry/asset handover.
- Aggregator attestation pack (quarterly).

# 22. Three Anonymised Scenarios

| Sector | Pattern | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| 300 MW BESS portfolio | 3 aggregators, 2 cloud dispatch APIs, warranty-voiding cycling. | Dispatch pathways count ↓ 14 → 3 attested; insurer reversal of B |
| Co-located solar + BESS | Aggregator coerces cycling to capture price spreads. | Cycling integrity alert; market surveillance referral. |
| Industrial behind-the-meter BESS | Vendor PCS firmware update without ECC. | ECC enforced; vendor on probation; insurer notified. |

# 23. Technical Appendix

- BESS architecture: EMS → Aggregator → SCADA → PCS → BMS → Fire system.
- Attack tree: forced cycling → degraded cells → thermal runaway → site loss.
- Insurer loss model: revenue + degradation + replacement + fire + grid penalty.
- Decommissioning identity plan: Day 1 design assumes Day 7,300 recovery.

# 24. Where This Doctrine Fails (Cost of Implementation)

- Fails when BMS, PCS, and EMS are treated as separate stacks.
- Fails when fire engineering and cyber are not jointly drilled.
- Fails when Day 1 design ignores decommissioning identity.
- Costs: aggregator contract renegotiation, joint runbook design, cycling monitoring. Payback in warranty preservation and insurer recognition.

# 25. Procurement & Tabletop Packs

## 25.1 Procurement Clause Pack

- PCS / BMS / EMS vendors must accept ECC discipline for firmware.
- Aggregator dispatch must be attested per quarter.
- Warranty terms must reference cycling integrity monitoring.
- Fire and cyber must share runbook ownership with named officers.
- Decommissioning plan must be filed at commissioning, not at retirement.

# 26. Evidence Basis — External References & Standards Anchors

Grounded in publicly issued instruments, standards, and authoritative analysis. Independently testable propositions.

- NFPA 855 (energy storage systems).
- UL 9540 / UL 9540A (BESS safety).
- IEC 62933 (electrical energy storage systems).
- NERC IRPS cyber alerts on BESS.
- Insurance industry BESS loss studies (Marsh / SwissRe).

# 27. Counterargument & Rebuttal

*Tier 1A doctrine is testable against its strongest critique.*

Skeptics argue that BESS cyber risk is theoretical and that the dominant loss mode remains thermal. The rebuttal is that thermal events from control compromise are now the documented loss vector, and the energy-transition asset base is large enough that the absence of public incidents to date is not a basis for asset-class confidence going forward.

# Annex A — About the Author

Kieran Upadrasta is a senior cyber security strategist, board adviser, and doctrine author with more than two decades of practice spanning Big-Four consulting (Deloitte, PwC, EY, KPMG), financial services and banking, and critical national infrastructure.

- CISSP · CISM · CRISC · CCSP · MBA · BEng.
- Lead Auditor — Information Security Forum (ISF).
- Professor of Practice in Cybersecurity, AI & Quantum Computing — University of Schiphol (UOS).
- Honorary Senior Lecturer — Imperial. Researcher — UCL.
- Platinum Member — ISACA London. Gold Member — (ISC)² London.
- Programme Lead, Cyber Security — PRMIA.

*Contact: info@kieranupadrasta.com · www.kie.ie · linkedin.com/in/kieranupadrasta*

# Annex B — About CSAIC & University of Schiphol (UOS) Affiliation

Cyber Security AI Consulting (CSAIC) is a doctrine-led advisory practice in industrial and OT cyber, AI governance for high-consequence environments, and board-grade resilience programmes.

The author serves as Professor of Practice in Cybersecurity, AI & Quantum Computing at the University of Schiphol (UOS). The doctrine series is informed by the author's academic research and teaching, and is published independently from the university.

# Annex C — Quotable Pull-Sheet

*“A battery is not storage. It is a remotely controllable industrial asset.”*

*“Chemistry sets the ceiling. Control sets the loss.”*

*“Every command path is a credit decision.”*

*“Cyber, safety, and fire are one risk.”*

*“Cycling is a credit decision in disguise.”*

*“Money leaves before the smoke.”*

*“Day 1 design assumes Day 7300 recovery.”*

**Press Wire Drop-Quotes**

**Benzinga:** Hostile Batteries: BESS Cyber Risk Is The Energy Transition's Quiet Liability

**Yahoo Finance:** A Battery Isn't Storage — It's A Remotely Controllable Industrial Asset

**CNBC:** Fire, Cyber And Market Risk Converge In Grid-Scale Battery Storage

**MarketWatch:** Cycling Integrity Becomes A Warranty And Capital-Markets Variable For BESS

**Reuters:** Insurers Demand Attested Dispatch Pathways For Battery Energy Storage Operators

**Financial Times:** Storage's Hidden Risk: How Coerced Cycling Quietly Moves Market Revenue

# Annex D — Board One-Pager

*Single-page synopsis for board pre-read or sales meeting attachment.*

## Hostile Batteries

*The Cyber-Physical Risk Inside the Energy Transition's Fastest-Growing Asset Class*

> *“A battery is not storage. It is a remotely controllable industrial asset.”*

- Thesis: BESS is a remotely controllable industrial asset, not storage.
- Buy: dispatch attestation + cycling integrity + cyber-fire runbooks.
- Measure: attested dispatch pathways count; cycling integrity score.
- Win: warranty preserved; insurer reverses BESS exclusions.
- Risk: aggregator cloud APIs unattested = systemic exposure.

*Engagement contact: info@kieranupadrasta.com · www.kie.ie · University of Schiphol (UOS).*