Foundations of OT, ICS and SCADA Security by Kai London
Most OT security failures begin with a security professional who does not understand the plant, or an engineer who does not understand the threat. Volume 1 closes the first gap — the equipment, the protocols, the safety systems and the architecture — before any control is proposed.
Available on Amazon.
What is inside
The equipment, explained
PLCs, HMIs, RTUs, DCS and historians — what each does, how it is engineered, and how it fails.
Industrial protocols
Modbus, DNP3, OPC and their relatives, including the design assumptions that predate any notion of hostile networks.
Safety systems
SIS and functional safety, and why the relationship between safety and security is a design question, not a policy one.
The Purdue model in practice
What the reference architecture assumes, and what a real plant network looks like after twenty years of change.
How IT and OT actually differ
Availability, lifecycle, patch windows and change control — and why enterprise practice imported wholesale causes harm.
The OT threat picture
Consequence-driven risk, historical incidents and what they teach about realistic attacker objectives.
Who it is for: security professionals moving into OT, control and automation engineers taking on security duties, plant technology leaders, and anyone starting the four-volume series.
Learn the process first. A control that stops the plant is not a security win.
About the author
Professor Kai London — CISSP, CISM.
An internationally recognised cybersecurity executive, board advisor and Founder & CEO of Quantum AI Systems Security LLC, writing at the convergence of AI, governance and operational resilience. Honorary Professor and Researcher at UCL.